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FALSE LIGHT PRIVACY ACTIONS:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND
STANDARDS OF PROOF OF FAULT
NO. 86-80
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1986
SHORELINE PRESS, INC.,
Defendant-Petitioner,
VS.
BRADLEY STARK,
Plaintiff-Respondent.

BENCH MEMORANDUM*
George B. Trubow**
Kenneth A. Michaels, Jr.***
This false light action arises from a news item appearing in defendant's newspaper which said that the plaintiff had filed for personal bankruptcy. The United States Supreme Court's grant of Writ
of Certiorari ordered the parties to address the following issues:
1. Whether the Constitution requires that a private person prove
Sullivan malice to recover in a false light action where the injurious falsehood is not a matter of public concern?
2. If a private person in a false light action, not involving a matter of
public concern, need not prove deliberate falsity or reckless disregard of the truth, do constitutional constraints require that the
plaintiff prove fault?
3. If the plaintiff in a false light action by a private person, not involving a matter of public concern, must prove negligence, does
the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur satisfy consti* This memorandum is based, in part, on materials appearing in Trubow, The
Tort Law of Privacy, 1 PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE (G. Trubow ed. 1987).
** Professor of Law; Director, Center for Information Technology and Privacy
Law, The John Marshall Law School. A.B., J.D., The University of Michigan Law
School.
*** Assistant to the Director, Center for Information Technology and Privacy
Law, The John Marshall Law School. A.B., Loyola University of Chicago; J.D., The
John Marshall Law School.
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tutional requirements of proof?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff-respondent brought this action based upon diversity
jurisdiction. Defendant-petitioner did not object to venue in the
District of Marshall. The parties agree that the common law of the
State of Marshall applies in this cause.
The parties have stipulated to the following facts. Defendant
publishes a daily newspaper in the State of Lincoln, where defendant maintains its corporate offices and principal place of business.
Copies of newspapers containing the article in question were distributed in the abutting State of Marshall. Plaintiff is an attorney licensed and practicing in the State of Marshall.
On Monday, May 14, 1984, defendant published its weekly column on developments in the legal community which included the
following:
Personal injury lawyer Bradley Stark, with business in the doldrums,
filed for bankruptcy last week.
On Tuesday, May 22, 1984, Stark filed this false light action against
the defendant. Stark's complaint alleged that defendant publicized
an untruthful statement which placed Stark in a false light in a
manner highly offensive to a reasonable person. He asked for compensatory and punitive damages. The trial court denied the newspaper's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to allege deliberate
or reckless falsity.
Amy Curtin, a reporter for defendant, regularly prepares items
about developments in the legal community for defendant's weekly
"Law News" column. On Wednesday, May 9, 1984, she drafted an
article for the "Law News" column using a personal computer in her
home. Curtin's personal computer is linked by telephone lines to the
newspaper's mainframe computer through use of a modem. After
entering her personal password, she transmitted the article to defendant's mainframe computer for future processing. Defendant's
mainframe and electronic publishing program is similar to state-ofthe-art systems used in the industry. Curtin alleges that her article
as transmitted did not contain any reference whatsoever to plaintiff.
No evidence to the contrary was presented.
Douglas Adams, editor of the newspaper's business section
where "Law News" appears, examined Curtin's article on Thursday,
May 10. He used the terminal on his desk, having gained access to
the mainframe file by using his personal password. Adams edited
Curtin's article which he says contained no reference to plaintiff.
The next day, Adams electronically formatted all materials for the
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"Law News" column in preparation for printing. He confirms there
was no reference in the article to plaintiff yet.
As usual, the business section for Monday's paper was printed
on Sunday afternoon for distribution early the next morning.
Michael Roper, defendant's director of printing, used the computer
terminal at his desk to load the formatted and edited Monday business section from the mainframe into the computer which operates
the printing presses.
No evidence exists of any computer malfunction. However, one
of defendant's employees could have inserted the offensive material
without leaving any identifying evidence. Alternatively, a skilled
"hacker" could have penetrated defendant's system from the outside
through telephone lines.
Plaintiff has never filed for bankruptcy for himself or represented anyone in a bankruptcy matter. Moreover, defendant admits
that the "Law News" column never before contained any information about an attorney filing for personal bankruptcy, nor does it
assign reporters to check bankruptcy filings at the federal
courthouse.
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court found that no
genuine issue of material fact existed and that plaintiff was entitled,
as a matter of law, to judgment on the issue of liability alone.
The district court held that the requirement in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), of knowledge of falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth, was not applicable to this
false light action because the speech involved here was about a private person and was not a matter of public interest. The district
court also held that this action was one sounding in strict liability
because constitutional constraints were not applicable and fault was
not a requirement in plaintiff's prima facie case. The court noted
that even if defendant was required to prove fault, the plaintiff was
negligent as a matter of law under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
because it failed to maintain a secure printing system. Finally, the
district court held that the order granting summary judgment for
plaintiff on the issue of liability involved controlling questions of law
as to which there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of litigation.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Circuit
noted jurisdiction and permitted an interlocutory appeal. The Court
of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. It affirmed that the
plaintiff need not show Sullivan malice because this case involves a
private person plaintiff and is not a matter of public interest. It re-
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versed on the issue of fault and held that Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), requires the plaintiff in a false light action
to prove at least negligence on the part of defendant. Holding that
res ipsa loquitur does not satisfy the constitutional mandate that
plaintiff prove fault, and finding that the stipulated facts did not
support the negligence of defendant with convincing clarity, the
Court of Appeals remanded the case for further proceedings.
ANALYSIS

I.

BACKGROUND

A. Common Law False Light Actions
In the State of Marshall, the prima facie case for actions sounding in false light invasion of privacy requires that a plaintiff prove
that (1) defendant publicized (2) a matter concerning plaintiff (3)
placing that plaintiff before the public in a false light (4) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Judicial recognition of a right of privacy is a relatively recent
phenomenon in the common law. Although the philosophical basis
for the development of this right can be found in history, the seminal law review article by Warren and Brandeis was principally responsible for the rise of this tort. Warren and Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). They thought that a judicially enforceable right of privacy was necessary in an urban culture
with enhanced communication abilities.
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and
man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have,
through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and
distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.

Id. at 196.
About three decades later, the first Restatement of Torts recognized an enforceable right of privacy at common law:
A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the other.
Restatement of Torts § 867. By this time, enough case law had developed to support the existence of the new tort. "Modern decisions
allow recovery in situations in which it is not possible rationally to
use the older bases of recovery, and the interest is now recognized as
having an independent existence." Id. § 867, comment b.
By 1960, there were more than three hundred decisions discuss-
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ing this privacy right. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 388
(1960). In analyzing these cases, Dean Prosser found not one tort
but four.
The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of four
different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except that
each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff, in the
phrase coined by Judge Cooley, "to be let alone." Without any attempt to exact definition, these four torts may be described as follows:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye.
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's
name or likeness.
Id. at 389 (citations omitted). In analyzing false light actions, Prosser said that "[tihe interest protected is clearly that of reputation,
with the same overtones of mental distress as in defamation." Id. at
400.
Professor Bloustein disagreed with Prosser and, in a discussion
that appears to be consistent with the Warren and Brandeis thesis,
concluded that the privacy right protects against affronts to human
dignity.
An intrusion on our privacy threatens our liberty as individuals to do
as we will, just as an assault, a battery or imprisonment of our person
does. And just as we may regard these latter torts as offenses to the
reasonable sense of personal dignity, as offensive to our concept of
individualism and the liberty it entails, so too should we regard privacy as a dignitary tort.
Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 962, (1964) (citations omitted).
The most recent hornbook bearing Prosser's name but written
by other editors, appears to accept Bloustein's approach:
The action for defamation and the action for invasion of privacy
should be carefully distinguished. The former is to protect a person's
interest in good reputation . . . . The latter is to protect a person's
interest in being let alone. . ..
W.P. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton and D. Owen, Prosserand Keeton on the Law of Torts § 117, at 864 (5th Ed. 1984).
The Second Restatement of Torts now recognizes these four
distinct branches of the privacy tort, including false light. Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 652 (1977). There continues to be disagreement in the case law about the nature of the protected interest.
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B. Publicity in False Light Actions
In false light privacy actions, the plaintiff must prove general
publicity of the offensive material. Publicity for false light actions
differs from publication in defamation actions.
Publication, in that sense, is a word of art, which includes any communication by the defendant to a third person. Publicity, on the other
hand, means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to
the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be
regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.
The difference is not one of the means of communication, which may
be oral, written or by any other means. It is one of a communication
that reaches, or is sure to reach, the public.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D comment a (1977). In the
problem case, no question should arise that publication in the newspaper constituted sufficient publicity. Whether the defendant is responsible for the publication is another matter.
Although responsibility for publicity has not arisen in a false
light context, it has been held that a proprietor can be liable for
defamation published through the proprietor's system, even though
the proprietor himself does not know of the publication or had initially caused it.
In World Publishing Co. v. Minahan, 70 Okla. 107, 173 P. 815
(1918), the court found the editor of a newspaper liable for the publication of a defamatory article which was published while he was
away on vacation. The court stated: "The managing editor of a
newspaper is equally liable with the proprietor for the publication of
a libelous article, and this whether he knows of the publication or
not, as it is his duty to know the contents of all articles published."
Id. at 110, 173 P. at 817.
In Paton v. Great Northwestern Telegraph Co., 141 Minn. 430,
170 N.W. 511 (1919), the court found the telegraph company liable
for the publication of patently defamatory matter that it received
and sent over its equipment without making any inquiry as to its
truth or falsity. The court stated: "A telegraph company may be required to respond in damages for transmitting and delivering a message libelous on its face, unless the message be privileged or the
charge be justified." Id. at 433, 170 N.W. at 511. The court added
that a communication is "privileged if the operator acted carefully
and in good faith, but was not privileged if he was negligent or
wanting in good faith, in sending it." Id. at 433-34, 170 N.W. at 512.
In Pettengill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 88 Mich. App. 587, 278
N.W.2d 682 (1979), plaintiff sued for libel because of an item inserted by an unknown employee in the defendant's classified
advertisements.
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In defendant's motion for summary judgment and affidavit it excuses
the publication on the basis that the procedure for processing classified advertisements is highly automated and that the libelous matter
was inserted by an unknown employee. Defendant did not answer
plaintiff's complaint that defendant negligently failed to proofread the
newspaper.
We do not think that defendant can hide behind the theory that a
"phantom writer" is responsible for its negligence.
Id. at 591, 278 N.W.2d at 684.
On the other hand, the following cases are instances where the
courts have not found the defendant's duty or participation to be
sufficient to establish responsibility for the publication of defamatory matter.
In Scott v. Hull, 22 Ohio App. 2d 141, 259 N.E.2d 160 (1970),
the court held that the defendants were not liable for defamation
where an unknown person inscribed defamatory graffiti on the exterior wall of a building owned and maintained by the defendants.
The court said that liability for defamation must be "predicted
upon actual publication by the defendant or on the defendant's ratification of a publication by another." Id. at 143, 259 N.E.2d at 161.
Publication involves "a positive act, or something done by the person sought to be charged, malfeasance in the case of an intentional
defamatory publication and misfeasance in the case of a negligent
defamatory publication. Nonfeasance, on the other hand, is not a
predicate for liability." Id. at 144, 259 N.E.2d at 162.
The court in Folwell v. Miller, 145 F. 495 (2d Cir. 1906), held
that the president of a newspaper was not individually liable for a
libel published in his absence. The court said that "when it appears
affirmatively that [defendant] was not on duty during any part of
the time between the reception of the libelous matter by the newspaper and the publication, and could not have had any actual part
in composing or publishing, we think he cannot be held liable without disregarding the settled rule of law by which no man is bound
for the tortious act of another over whom he was not a master's
power of control." Id. at 497.
The court in Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co.,
336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939), did not find the defendant radio
station liable for an impromptu defamatory statement extemporaneously spoken by a person hired by a lessee and not in the employ of
the defendant. The court concluded that the broadcaster's liability
is extinguished through its exercise of due care in the selection of a
lessee and the inspection and editing of the script to be broadcast:
"[A] broadcasting company that leases its time and facilities to another, whose agents carry on the program, is not liable for an interjected defamatory remark where it appears that it exercised due
care in the selection of the lessee, and, having inspected and edited
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the script, had no reason to believe an extemporaneous defamatory
remark would be made." Id. at 204, 8 A.2d at 312.
C. The Evolution of Sullivan Malice
It is well settled that defenses applicable to defamation also apply to the false light privacy tort. Because the privacy tort also involves publication of false speech, constitutional constraints on defamation also may be applicable to false light privacy.
Prior to 1964, defamatory publications were not considered to
be within constitutionally protected speech because they were false
statements and the constitution was held to protect the truth, not
lies. The law of defamation was the sole province of state courts and
legislatures. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). In
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964), the
United States Supreme Court said that even some falsity was protected by the Constitution and held that "the Constitution delineates a State's power to award damages for libel in actions brought
by public officials against critics of their official conduct." (emphasis
added). Subsequent to Sullivan, the Court developed the scope of
the constitutional limitations on state defamation law in an attempt
to reach an accommodation between the states' interests in compensating individuals for harm to reputation and first amendment concerns for free speech. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 34143 (1974).
The plaintiff in Sullivan alleged that he had been libeled by
statements made in an advertisement published in the defendant's
newspaper. 376 U.S. at 256-57. The advertisement concerned widespread, non-violent demonstrations staged by black students at Alabama State College in support of their rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. The advertisement claimed that these students were
being met by a wave of terror. The plaintiff was the commissioner of
police when the incidents occurred. Some of the statements in the
advertisement were inaccurate descriptions of the events.
The Court stated that the case must be considered in the context of "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 376
U.S. at 270. The Court also noted that the advertisement concerned
a "movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the
highest public interest and concern." Id. Thus, the advertisement
clearly qualified for constitutional protection.
The Sullivan Court further ruled that "neither factual error nor
defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield from
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criticism of official conduct." Id. at 273. The common law rule allowing only truth as a defense to libel actions was held inadequate
to protect first amendment rights. Id. at 278. Requiring critics of
official conduct to guarantee the truth of all factual assertions may
deter them "from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed
to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt
whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to
do so. .

.

. The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety

of public debate." Id. at 279. Therefore, a public official cannot recover "damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to this official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual
malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 279-80.
The Sullivan malice standard was subsequently extended by
the Supreme Court to cases in which the plaintiff is a "public figure." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated
Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In Butts, an article published
in the defendant's magazine accused the plaintiff, the athletic director at the University of Georgia, of conspiring to "fix" a football
game. 388 U.S. at 135-36.
In Walker, the defendant released a news dispatch giving an
account of a riot that erupted because of federal efforts to enforce a
court decree ordering the enrollment of a black man as a student in
the University of Mississippi. 388 U.S. at 140. The dispatch stated
that the plaintiff led a violent crowd in a charge against federal marshalls on the campus. Although the plaintiff was a private citizen at
the time of the riot and publication, he "had made a number of
strong statements against such action which had received wide publicity" and "could fairly be deemed a man of some political prominence." Id. In both cases, the Court held that since the individuals
were public figures, they must prove Sullivan malice to recover for
the defamatory statements.
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1970), the defendant's radio station broadcast news reports concerning the plaintiff's arrest for possession of obscene literature. Id. at 34-35. The
plaintiff filed a libel action for damages after he was acquitted of
criminal obscenity charges upon a ruling that the magazines were
not obscene. Id. at 36.
In affirming the Court of Appeals, which reversed an award of
damages for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court applied the Sullivan
malice standard. The Court ruled that the standard applies "to all
discussion and communication involving matters of public or general
concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous
or anonymous." Id. at 43-44. The Court did not define what "an
issue of public or general concern" means, but explained that "it
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was leaving the definition of the reach of that term to future cases."
Id. at 44-45.
Four years later, Rosenbloom was limited by the Supreme Court
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). The Gertz
Court held that "the New York Times [Sullivan] rule states an accommodation between [the first amendment] concern and the limited state interest present in the context of libel actions brought by
public persons." Id. at 343. The Court said that
the States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce
a legal remedy for defamatory falsehoods injurious to the reputation
of a private individual. The extension of the New York Times test
proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge this legitimate
state interest to a degree that we find unacceptable. And it would occasion that additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to
decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general
or public interest' and which do not - to determine, in the words of
Mr. Justice Marshall, 'what information is relevant to selfgovernment.'
Id.
As a result, the Sullivan malice standard was not required simply
because the defamatory statement involved issues of general or public interest.
In Gertz, the defendant was publisher of a monthly magazine
expressing the views of the John Birch Society. 418 U.S. at 325-26.
An article appeared in the magazine in March, 1969, entitled
"FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio and The War On Police." Nuccio was
a policeman who was tried for the murder of a youth. The youth's
family was represented by Elmer Gertz, who was portrayed in the
article as the architect of a "frame-up." The article, which warned of
a nationwide communist conspiracy to discredit police, made several
false and inaccurate statements about him.
The Court held that the plaintiff was neither a public official
nor a public figure, and that the Sullivan malice standard did not
apply. Id. at 345-46. In defining the appropriate standard of liability, the Court stated: "[W]e hold that, so long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." Id. This approach "recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in
compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation,
yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of a strict
liability for defamation." Id. at 348. Accordingly, a private plaintiff
must establish at least negligence to recover in a libel action.
The "strong and legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals" is the basis of the Gertz standard. Id. at 348-49.
However, "this countervailing state interest extends no further than
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compensation for actual injury;" therefore, "States may not permit
recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is
not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
for the truth." Id. The Court reasoned that the possibility of presumed and punitive damages "compounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 349750. Consequently,
under Gertz, presumed and punitive damages cafinot be recovered
by a private plaintiff absent a showing of Sullivan malice, though
actual damages can be recovered for mere negligence alone.
Last year, the Supreme Court addressed the application of
Gertz in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749 (1985). In Greenmoss Builders, a contractor brought a defamation action against a credit reporting agency. The defendant had
erroneously reported that the plaintiff had filed a voluntary petition
for bankruptcy, and defendant grossly misrepresented the plaintiff's
assets and liabilities. This report was sent to five of the defendant's
subscribers pursuant to an agreement under which the subscribers
would not reveal the information to others. Id. at 751.
The Supreme Court held that a distinction must be made between "matters of public concern" and "matters of purely private
concern." Id. at 758-60. In applying the Gertz approach of balancing
the State's interest against the first amendment interest, the Court
held that the State interest was "strong and legitimate." Id. at 757.
However, the Court found that the first amendment interest involved here was "less important" than that involved in Gertz. Id. at
758. The Court explained that "[iut is speech on 'matters of public
concern' that is at the heart of the First Amendment's protection."
Id. On the other hand, "speech on matters of purely private concern
is of less First Amendment concern." Id. at 759.
Accordingly, the Court held that Sullivan malice was not required for punitive damages in an action by a private plaintiff when
no matter of public concern was involved. The court reasoned that
"[tihere is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues;
there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of
ideas concerning self-government; and there is no threat of liability
causing a reaction of self-censorship by the press." Id. at 760.
With the change in the application of Sullivan malice in Greenmoss Builders, the relation of Gertz to actions involving private
plaintiffs and speech about matters not of public concern appears to
be an open question. Is Gertz entirely inapplicable in such cases?
If Gertz is to be distinguished from this case, on the ground that it
applies only where the allegedly false publication deals with a matter
of general or public importance, then where the false publication does
not deal with such a matter, the common-law rules would apply
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whether the defendant is a member of the media or other public disseminator or a non-media individual publishing privately. Although
Justice Powell speaks only of the inapplicability of the Gertz rule with
respect to presumed and punitive damages, it must be that the Gertz
requirement of some kind of fault on the part of the defendant is also
inapplicable in cases such as this.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. at
773-74 (White, J., concurring).
Although the Greenmoss Court held that the media/nonmedia
distinction was not the basis for determining whether Gertz should
be applied, that distinction was raised once again in the case of
PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986). In
that case, plaintiff store owners brought an action against the defendant newspaper for publishing five articles in which the plaintiff
was linked to organized crime and accused of having improperly influenced the state governmental processes. The trial court, following
the Gertz case, instructed the jury that the plaintiffs bore the burden of proving the falsity of the allegations. (At common law, a defamatory publication was presumed to be false so that the burden
was on the defendant to prove substantial truth as a defense.) The
state supreme court reversed, holding that the requirement that the
plaintiff prove negligence, as Gertz demanded, did not also require
proof of falsity. On appeal, in a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that when the case involved a private plaintiff, a media defendant, and a matter of public concern, then falsity as well as
fault was a burden on the plaintiff and could not be presumed. Of
particular interest in Hepps is the following footnote:
We also have no occasion to consider the quantity of proof of falsity
that a private figure plaintiff must present to recover damages. Nor
need we consider what standards would apply if the plaintiff sues a
nonmedia defendant ... [cite omitted] or if a State were to provide a
plaintiff with the opportunity to obtain a judgment that declared the
speech at issue to be false but did not give rise to liability for
damages.
Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1565, n.4 (1986).
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, simply noted that he
believed the burden of falsity belonged to every plaintiff, regardless
of whether or not a media defendant was involved. Id. at 1565-66
(Brennan, J., concurring). Accordingly, only a plurality of the court
supports the media/nonmedia distinction in Hepps.
It appears, therefore, for the time being, that the court has left
open the following issue to be resolved in future cases: Though the
plaintiff must prove fault by "clear and convincing" evidence when
Sullivan malice is required, does a lesser standard apply to negligence by a media defendant?
In summary, then, the principal cases provide as follows:
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1. New York Times v. Sullivan enunciated the "Sullivan malice" (deliberate or reckless falsity) standard, which must be alleged
and proved if a public official is the defamation plaintiff.
2. Walker and Butts extended the Sullivan malice requirement
to public figure defamation plaintiffs.
3. Gertz said that matters of general or public interest did not
perforce require Sullivan malice. A private defamation plaintiff
could recover actual damages in accord with state law, except that
liability could not be imposed without fault. Accordingly, Gertz require the proof of negligence at least. To recover presumed or punitive damages, however, the plaintiff must allege and prove Sullivan
malice.
4. Greenmoss Builders limited Gertz on the question of punitive damages to matters of public concern. Whether state law governs other aspects of defamation actions brought by private plaintiffs regarding communications that do not involve matters of public
concern was not specifically addressed in the majority opinion. Sullivan malice would be required to recover punitive damages if the
defamation involved a matter of public concern.
5. Hepps held that the falsity of the speech must also be proven
by the plaintiff when the media is a defendant.
It is uncontested in the instant case that the speech involves a
private matter. Thus, that issue was not addressed in the order
granting certiorari.
II.

WHAT STANDARD DOES THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRE THAT A

PLAINTIFF PROVE IN A FALSE LIGHT ACTION: Sullivan MALICE OR
NEGLIGENCE?

The Restatement of Torts incorporates the Sullivan malice
standard into its prima facie case for false light actions.
§ 652E. Publicity Placing Person In False Light
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places

the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and

(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as
to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in
which the other would be placed.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977). A caveat, however,

follows immediately after this section:
The Institute takes no position on whether there are any circumstances under which recovery can be obtained under this Section if
the actor did not know of or act with reckless disregard as to the fal-
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sity of the matter publicized and the false light in which the other
would be placed but was negligent in regard to these matters.
Id. The Restatement position was based upon the pre-Gertz law,
and only the caveat acknowledges the post-Gertz trend.
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967), the Court, in
a pre-Gertz decision, held that in a false light privacy case the plaintiff, a "newsworthy person," was required to prove Sullivan malice.
The Court applied Sullivan malice in this matter of public interest
but noted that this conclusion was reached only by applying first
amendment principles in Sullivan. Id. at 390-91.
Months after Gertz was decided, a false light case arose where a
newspaper published a false story about the poverty of a family
whose father had been killed when a bridge collapsed. Cantrell v.
Forest City PublishingCo., 419 U.S. 245 (1974). The trial judge had
instructed the jury that liability would attach only upon a finding
that the newspaper acted with Sullivan malice. Id. The plaintiff had
alleged Sullivan malice, and on appeal the matter was not raised. Id.
The Supreme Court stated:
Consequently, this case presents no occasion to consider whether a
State may constitutionally apply a more relaxed standard of liability
for a publisher or broadcaster of false statements injurious to a private individual under a false-light theory of invasion of privacy, or
whether the constitutional standard announced in Time, Inc. v. Hill
applies to all false-light cases. Cf Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323.
Id. at 250-51. However, the continued validity of Time, Inc. v. Hill
was questioned by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975):
The Court's abandonment [in Gertz] of the "matter of general or public interest" standard as the determinative factor for deciding whether
to apply the New York Times malice standard to defamation litigation brought by private individuals . . . calls into question the conceptual basis of Time, Inc. v. Hill. In neither Gertz nor our more recent decision in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., . . however,
have we been called upon to determine whether a State may constitutionally apply a more relaxed standard of liability under a false-light
theory of invasion of privacy.
.

Id. at 498 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
Some states have adopted the Restatement's language for false
light and have incorporated the Sullivan malice standard into the
prima facie case without regard to the caveat quoted above.
One case shows the possible anomaly created if Sullivan malice
is mandated in all false light cases. Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat
Co., 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076
(1980). An attorney had been suspended for misconduct; reinstatement was predicated upon his re-taking and passing the bar. Id. at

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 20:854

631, 590 S.W.2d at 841. Although the bar examiners customarily
supplied defendant newspaper with the names of all of those passing
the bar, plaintiff's name was not on the list. Id. The newspaper
falsely reported that plaintiff failed the bar. Id. at 632, 590 S.W.2d
at 841. The plaintiff sued for libel and false light invasion of privacy.
Id. at 633, 590 S.W.2d at 842. Applying Gertz and its progeny, the
Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff was not a public
figure, therefore Sullivan malice need not be proven in the libel
claim. Id. at 634-37, 590 S.W.2d at 843-44. Relying upon both Time,
Inc. v. Hill, and the Restatement approach, the court held that
plaintiff had to prove Sullivan malice to support his false light
claim. Id. at 639, 590 S.W.2d at 845.
Other jurisdictions have held that proof of Sullivan malice is
not constitutionally mandated in all false light actions. In Wood v.
Hustler, 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 783
(1985), the Fifth Circuit considered whether a private figure plaintiff
was required to prove Sullivan malice in a false light action against
a media defendant. The Wood court held that a private-figure false
light plaintiff need not prove Sullivan malice against a media defendant. Id. at 1091. The Wood court reasoned that application of
the actual malice standard in Time, Inc. v. Hill was justified because
published material was a question of public concern. However, the
authority of Time, Inc. v. Hill, is undermined when the subject matter is of private concern. Consequently, the private figure plaintiff in
Wood prevailed against a media defendant who negligently placed
that plaintiff in a false light. Id. at 1092.
Similarly the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held
that in light of decisions subsequent to Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Sullivan malice requirement is no longer applicable in privacy actions
against media defendants, at least where private figures are concerned. Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, 320 S.E.2d 70, 89 (W. Va.
1984). Citing Gertz, the court held that in the absence of a constitutionally privileged communication, the test to be applied in a false
light invasion of privacy action against media defendant is negligence, i.e., what a reasonable person would have done under like circumstances. Id.
III. DOES THE
Loquitur SATISFY

APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF Res Ipsa
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF PROOF OF
NEGLIGENCE?

One noted scholar explains the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
thus:
[Wihere it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused
the injury complained of was under the control or management of the
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defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as
in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its
control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence,
• . . that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant's want
of care.
S. Speiser, The Negligence Case: Res Ipsa Loquitur § 1:1 (1972).
The majority of American courts treat res ipsa loquitur as circumstantial evidence, thereby raising an inference of negligence; a minority of the courts give the doctrine a greater effect and elevate it
to the level of a presumption. W. P. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton
and D. Owen, Prosserand Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 40, at 25758 (5th Ed. 1984).
Whether an inference or a presumption, the Second Restatement of Torts states:
To determine whether res ipsa loquitur applies the courts will ask
whether:
a. the event is of the kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of negligence:
b. other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff
and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and
c. the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's
duty to the plaintiff.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D (1977).
The second element in this analysis modifies what was traditionally known as the exclusive control requirement. "It would be
far better, and much confusion would be avoided, if the rigid 'control' test were discarded altogether, and we were to require instead
that the apparent negligent cause of the accident be such that the
defendant would more likely than not be responsible for it." W.P.
Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 39, at 25051. The common law test for a finding of res ipsa loquitur has been
proof that defendant exercised exclusive control over the instrumentality of the injury and that in the ordinary course of events, but for
defendant's negligence, this injury would not have resulted. A growing trend in the courts is a broader application of the doctrine by
utilizing a probability analysis.
All that is needed is evidence from which reasonable persons can say
that on the whole it is more likely that there was negligence associated
with the cause of the event than that there was not .... Where no
such balance of probabilities in favor of negligence can reasonably be
found, res ipsa loquitur does not apply.
Id. at 248 (citations omitted).
In the instant case, there may be a question about whether the
defendant exercised exclusive control over its publication system,
and a question about whether the first amendment precludes the
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application of the doctrine to prove fault in false light cases.
A. Exclusive Control
The record does not set forth any certain test for applying res
ipsa loquitur. However, regardless of which test is applied, whether
these facts warrant, as a matter of law, the application of res ipsa
loquitur, depends upon the defendant's control over the publication.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not apply where the agency causing the accident was not under the sole and exclusive control of the
person sought to be charged with the injury, and if it appears that the
accident was, or might have been in part due to the act of a third
person over whom the defendant had no control, the doctrine is not
applicable . .. . In other words, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
not applicable where the defendant has no control over the injuring
instrumentality, or where there is a divided responsibility, and the injury may have resulted from a cause over which the defendant had no
control.
S. Speiser, The Negligence Case: Res Ipsa Loquitur § 2:11 (1972)
(citations omitted).
The issue of exclusive control arises in the instant case because
none of the parties has knowledge of who inserted the sentence relating to plaintiff. Thus, the question of control will turn on whether
the court focuses on defendant's conduct in implementing a publication system accessible by unknown third parties or disgruntled
employees.
B. Constitutional Requirements and Res Ipsa Loquitur
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court concluded plaintiffs must prove Sullivan malice with clear and convincing evidence.
376 U.S. at 285-86. The Court recently reaffirmed the clear and convincing evidence standard in the context of a defendant's motion for
summary judgment where Sullivan malice must be proved. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
In sum, we conclude that the determination whether a given factual
dispute requires submission to a jury must be guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the case .... Consequently,
where the New York Times 'clear and convincing" evidence requirement applies, the trial judge's summary judgment inquiry as to
whether a genuine issue exists will be whether the evidence presented
is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for either the plaintiff or the defendant.
Id. at 2514.
The Court has left open the question of whether private-figure
plaintiffs must show clear and convincing evidence of negligence
where the speech does not involve a matter of public concern and
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state law has not adopted Sullivan malice in al injurious falsehood
cases. One commentator has recently addressed this question but
did not support his conclusion with any authority. "Proof of actual
malice may be distinguished from proof of negligence in that actual
malice must be established by 'clear and convincing evidence' while
negligence need not be." Bloom, Proof of Fault in Media Defamation Litigation, 38 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 247, 255 (1985).
Even if the "clear and convincing" evidence is the appropriate
standard in all injurious falsehood cases, it is an open question
whether applying a liberal interpretation of res ipsa loquitur suffices
to meet this elevated standard.

